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Wiretapping the Internet: Analyzing the
Application of the Federal Wiretap Act’s
Party Exception Online
Hayden Driscoll*
Abstract
The federal Wiretap Act—originally enacted to curtail the
government’s unbridled use of wiretaps to monitor telephonic
communications—was amended in 1986 to provide a private right
of action, extending the Act’s Fourth Amendment-like protections to
private intrusions. Since the advent of the internet, plaintiffs have
attempted to predicate claims of unauthorized online privacy
intrusions on the Wiretap Act. In response, defendants claim they
are parties to the communications at issue and should be absolved
of liability under the Act’s party exception. The federal circuit courts
of appeal disagree on how the party exception applies in the internet
context. This Note evaluates the courts’ differing conclusions and
rationales and proposes two solutions, both of which share the
common thread of applying heightened notice and consent
requirements to online communications.
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I. Introduction
“There are few things as revealing as a person’s search
history,” 1 and yet, Google collects this information on over 3.5
billion searches each day. 2 And Google isn’t the only one privy to
this information. 3
After catching up on his Facebook news feed, John logged out
of his account and began performing some searches on Google.
John had been having internal struggles recently and was
concerned about his mental health, so he began searching for
options using search terms, such as “therapists near me.” John
spent hours visiting different therapists’ websites and reading
articles on mental health, using even more specific search terms to
try and figure out what was going on with him.
The next day, John came across a blog post by Nik Cubrilovic,
which detailed Facebook’s tracking practices and revealed that
even when Facebook users were logged out, Facebook continued
tracking its users across the internet, collecting—among other
things—the URLs users visited.
John became concerned that the research he had done the
previous day was not private. Would others know John had
searched for help with his mental health? Upon further
investigation, John learned that URLs contain search terms,
allowing Facebook to see exactly what John had searched for. This
wasn’t the worst part. John also learned that Facebook didn’t keep
this data to itself; it sold the data to others. John was thoroughly
disgruntled and felt that his privacy had been violated. He wanted
to hold Facebook responsible and stop it from sharing this sensitive
information with others. But he wasn’t sure how to do this. 4

1. Alfred Ng, Google is Giving Data to Police Based on Search Keywords,
Court Docs Show, CNET (Oct. 8, 2020, 1:21 PM) [https://perma.cc/7Z8K-DLNY] .
2. See Maryam Mohison, 10 Google Search Statistics You Need to Know in
2021, OBERLO (Apr. 3, 2020) (explaining that Google statics understand user
behavior) [https://perma.cc/AV6W-XWWG].
3. See Part III (describing how cookies are used to collect data from users
across the internet).
4. This narrative is based loosely on the facts of In re Facebook, Inc. Internet
Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020), with some creative liberties taken
to illustrate the problem in a more relatable way.
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Internet companies want to be parties to all our
communications. It is no secret today that companies like
Facebook and Google are invisible, silent observers of our daily
interactions, listening to every conversation, observing our daily
routines, and then tracking these behaviors and selling the
information to others. 5 What is not as well known, however, is the
little to no recourse internet users have when these companies go
too far. 6
Some internet users have resorted to filing suit against tech
companies under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 7 i.e., the federal Wiretap Act, claiming that the companies
are guilty of wiretapping when they “intercept” 8 information in
electronic communications submitted by internet users online and
then use that information to profit via targeted advertising. 9
In response, tech companies claim they are parties to the
online communications because if they are considered parties, they
are exempted from liability per the Wiretap Act’s party
exception. 10 Federal circuit courts of appeal disagree on what
5. See Dennis Anon, How Cookies Track You Around the Web and How to
Stop Them, PRIVACY.NET (Feb. 24, 2018) (explaining how cookies track internet
users across the web) [https://perma.cc/UTZ2-ZY28]; see also Brooke Auxier et al.,
Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control over
Their Personal Information, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 15, 2019) (“A majority
of Americans believe their online and offline activities are being tracked and
monitored by companies and the government with some regularity.”)
[https://perma.cc/J3SQ-7MBB].
6. See Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—
and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018) (“As the data universe
keeps expanding, more and more of it falls outside the various specific laws on
the books.”) [https://perma.cc/UP89-9ABZ].
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2018).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2018) (providing criminal and civil sanctions
for “any person who . . . intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication”); see also id. §§ 2511(4)–(5) (describing civil and criminal liability
for a violation of subsection [1]).
9. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596–
97 (9th Cir. 2020) (setting out the background of the plaintiffs’ claim that
Facebook had violated, among other laws, the Wiretap Act when it continued
tracking Facebook users after they had logged out of their Facebook accounts).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018); see also, e.g., id. at 607–08 (considering
whether Facebook was exempted from liability under the Wiretap Act as a “party”
to the communications at issue).
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constitutes a “party” within the meaning of the Act. 11 This means
that if John chooses to sue Facebook under the Wiretap Act in the
Ninth Circuit, he has a shot at winning. On the other hand, if he
sues in the Third Circuit, he will likely lose.
This Note proposes solutions to the circuit split and explains
why tech companies that surreptitiously duplicate and forward
internet users’ online communications without their knowledge or
consent violate the Wiretap Act, as the Act’s overall objective of
protecting the privacy of communications is still relevant even
though the Act was not drafted with the online context in mind.
Part II discusses the history of the Wiretap Act and provides
the relevant language of the Act’s party exception.
Part III introduces cookies as the technological backdrop for
the discussion on the party exception. That Part then discusses the
invention of the cookie and how the technology has evolved since
and become problematic in the data privacy context, particularly
with regard to third-party cookies and tracking. Next, that Part
provides a detailed explanation on how cookies function to track
users across the internet. And finally, that Part discusses how tech
companies have been able to circumvent private attempts at
protecting internet users’ data, illustrating the need for an
effective legal recourse.
Part IV summarizes four cases relevant to the issue and
presents the circuit split that serves as the crux of this Note.
Finally, Part V proposes solutions to the principal issue that
has divided federal appeals courts—the lack of a definition of
“party” in the Wiretap Act. That Part first advocates for a
heightened knowledge-and-consent standard to replace the noticeand-consent standard prevalent in privacy law. It then lays out two
proposed solutions: (1) Congress should amend the Wiretap Act
and provide a definition for “party”; or (2) the Supreme Court
should provide lower courts with an interpretation of “party” that
can be applied in the internet context.

11. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607–608 (describing the different
interpretations of the term “party” among the federal circuit courts of appeal).
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II. The Wiretap Act
A. History of the Wiretap Act

The Wiretap Act proscribes the unauthorized interception and
disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic communications. 12 The
original version of the Wiretap Act—the Communications Act—
was enacted in 1934 as a response to Fourth Amendment concerns
surrounding the unbridled practice of wiretapping to monitor
telephonic communications. 13 Originally, the Act was primarily
concerned with regulating the government’s use of wiretaps, 14
which directly reflects Fourth Amendment law, as the Fourth
Amendment only protects citizens against unlawful governmental
Significantly,
through
the
Electronic
intrusions. 15
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) of 1986, Congress amended
the Wiretap Act to provide a private right of action, extending the
statute’s Fourth Amendment-like protections to private intrusions
as well. 16
One of the major concerns Congress expressed in the 1986
amendment to the Wiretap Act was that the legislation was not

12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018) (describing the elements: unauthorized
interception, disclosure, and use of wire, oral, or electronic communications.).
13. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 373, 378–79 (2014) (explaining the Wiretap’s history and the
concerns that prompted the enactment of its predecessor statute); see also S. REP.
NO. 99-541, at 1–2 (1986) (explaining that the Wiretap Act was enacted in the
first place as a way of extending Fourth Amendment protections).
14. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 379 (“Unlike the Communications Act,
however, the Wiretap Act includes a carefully crafted privacy regime regulating
lawful interceptions.”).
15. Fourth Amendment, LEGAL INFO. INST. (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does
not guarantee protection from all searches and seizures, but only those done by
the government and deemed unreasonable under law.”) [https://perma.cc/2Z7XYQKM].
16. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The postECPA Wiretap Act provides a private right of action . . . .”); see also In re 381
Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 132 A.d.3d 11, 20 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015) (interpreting the SCA, which, like the Wiretap Act, is part of the ECPA, as
“narrowly tailored to provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like protections for
computer communications”).
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keeping up with the technological advancements of the time. 17 At
that time, the technological advancements that prompted the
amendment to the legislation were “large-scale mail operations,
computer-to-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless
telephones, paging devices, and video teleconferencing.” 18
Since
1986,
technology,
specifically
within
the
telecommunications industry, has continued to advance rapidly. 19
From 2000 to 2010 alone, many landmark advancements were
made, including 2G, 2.5G, and 3G mobile networks, the advent of
WiFi networks, and smartphones, among others. 20 Since 2010,
advancements have included the invention of the Cloud, the
telecom industry’s use of the Internet of Things for connectivity,
and Artificial Intelligence. 21 Technology has been developing at
exponential rates, while legislation has failed to keep up. 22 The
Wiretap Act has not been legislatively amended in any meaningful
way to account for technological advancements since 1986, which
is extremely problematic, as courts have attempted to apply the
outdated statute to new technologies. 23 This has inevitably created
17. See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986) (“[The existing law] has not kept pace
with the development of communications and computer technology. Nor has it
kept pace with changes in the structure of the telecommunications industry.”).
18. See id (describing the technological developments that moved the
amendment forward).
19. See Jim Machi, Top 10 Telecom Advancements of the Past 10 Years,
DIALOGIC (Dec. 14, 2010, 11:29 AM) (listing 10 technological advancements within
the telecommunications industry from 2000 to 2010) [https://perma.cc/LZ3LK8L8?type=image].
20. See id. (listing the technologies that have transformed the telecom
sector).
21. See Bernard Marr, The 7 Biggest Technology Trends that Will Transform
Telecoms in 2020, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2019, 12:27 AM) (discussing some of the
largest technological advancements and trends within the telecommunications
industry leading up to 2020) [https://perma.cc/25AZ-9M23].
22. See Manav Tanneeru, Can the Law Keep up with Technology?, CNN
(Nov. 17, 2009) (“Legal experts said it’s difficult for the law to keep up with
emerging technology.”)[https://perma.cc/PAN9-HU6Z]; see also Marci Harris,
Here’s What Happens When Tech Outpaces Government, APOLITICAL (Sept. 12,
2019) (explaining that the exponential pace of technological development creates
a “pacing problem” when paired with the lagging pace of policy change)
[https://perma.cc/4CYX-FFSH].
23. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 385–86 (explaining two subsequent
amendments to the 1986 amendment of the Act that had little effect on its basic
structure).
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legal confusion, specifically
communications. 24

in

the

context

of

online

B. The Party Exception
The Wiretap Act excepts from liability anyone considered “a
party to the communication.” 25 The problem arising from this
exception is the Act’s failure to define “party,” which has resulted
in differing interpretations from the federal circuit courts. 26 As the
following Part will illustrate, this lack of uniformity among the
federal circuit courts becomes a major issue in the internet context
where internet companies like Facebook and Google are constantly
working to circumvent efforts to protect internet users’ privacy.
III. The Technological Landscape
Although there are multiple methods used to gather internet
users’ information, this Note will focus on the most well-known and
commonly used method employed by internet companies today:
cookies. 27 The use of cookies serves here to illustrate the problems
that arise with differing interpretations of “party” within the
meaning of the Wiretap Act. However, the problems identified, and
the solutions proposed in this Note, are applicable broadly, and the
use of cookies as an example is not to be construed as a constriction
on the applicability of the proposed solutions.
24. See Orin Kerr, Websurfing and the Wiretap Act, WASH. POST (June 4,
2015) (“Applying the Wiretap Act to the Internet can be tricky because the
Internet enables person-to-computer communications.”) [https://perma.cc/VJT47YKK].
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018) (describing the permissibility of a
person not acting under the color of the law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception).
26. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 607
(2020) (“The Wiretap Act does not define the term ‘party’ in its liability exemption,
and the other circuit courts that have considered the Act’s scope have interpreted
the term in different ways.”).
27. See What Is Online Tracking and How Do Websites Track You?, KOOFR
BLOG (identifying the different ways users are tracked across the internet and
identifying cookies as the most well-known and commonly used method)
[https://perma.cc/44T6-74JC].
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A. The Evolution of Cookies
1. The Invention of the Cookie
In 1994, Lou Montulli invented the cookie. 28 His purpose in
creating the technology was to give the internet memory. 29 Before
the invention of the cookie, Montulli says surfing the web was a lot
like having a conversation with the character Dory from Disney’s
Finding Nemo, 30 who suffers from short-term memory loss. 31
“Cookies are small text files stored on your devices” that provide
websites with information to help them identify you as the same
person and ultimately improve users’ browsing experience. 32
Without cookies, anytime a user added something to a virtual cart
and clicked away, that item would disappear; and each time a user
loaded a new page on Facebook, he or she would have to log in
again. 33 Therefore, cookies are desirable and help the internet
function properly. 34
2. First- and Third-Party Cookies
The original cookie invented by Montulli is now referred to as
a “first-party cookie.” 35 First-party cookies are created by the
owners of the websites users visit and “allow website owners to
28. Cleo Abram, How Ads Follow You Around the Internet, VOX (Feb. 3, 2020,
10:30 AM) [https://perma.cc/5WXJ-EYWM].
29. See id. (explaining the purpose of the cookie).
30. FINDING NEMO (Disney 2003).
31. Abram, supra note 28; see also Vicki Arkoff, The Ultimate Guide to
‘Finding Nemo’, HOWSTUFFWORKS, (describing Dory as the character who
introduces herself by saying “I suffer from short-term memory loss. It runs in my
family . . . at least I think it does . . . where are they?”) [https://perma.cc/22TACURR].
32. See What Is Online Tracking and How Do Websites Track You?, KOOFR
BLOG [hereinafter What Is Online Tracking] (laying out the different ways users
are tracked across the internet and identifying cookies as the most well-known
and commonly used method) [https://perma.cc/44T6-74JC].
33. See Abram, supra note 28 (explaining how cookies work).
34. See id. (explaining how cookies can be useful to the user).
35. See id. (distinguishing between first- and third-party cookies and
identifying first-party cookies as the original cookies invented by Montulli).
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collect analytics data, remember language settings, and perform
other useful functions that provide a good user experience.” 36
However, Montulli did not anticipate how his creation would
evolve. 37 In addition to the basic functions that help the internet
work properly, cookies can be used to track users across the
internet and store their browsing histories over long periods of
time. 38 This is the problematic function of third-party cookies. 39
Third-party cookies, as is evident from their name, are created
by entities other than the owners of a particular website. 40 One
example of this is the Facebook “like” button or “share” option
users frequently encounter on different websites they visit. 41 This
allows Facebook (the third party) to access the same information
website owners collect through first-party cookies. 42 Facebook then
uses that data to create user profiles and send users
advertisements based on their online behavior. 43 The use of thirdparty cookies by companies like Facebook becomes particularly

36. See What’s the Difference Between First and Third-Party Cookies?,
COOKIEPRO (last updated Sept. 3, 2021) [hereinafter What’s the Difference]
(defining first-party cookies as one “set by the publisher’s web server or any
JavaScript loaded on the website”) [perma.cc/4VRD-QG8Y].
37. See John Schwartz, Giving Web a Memory Cost Its Users Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 1, 2001) (explaining how cookies began as a harmless way to give the
internet memory but evolved into a mechanism for potentially impinging users’
privacy on the internet) [perma.cc/H6VS-QK3E].
38. See What Is Online Tracking, supra note 32 (explaining the different
ways websites track their users, including through the use of third-party cookies).
39. See id. (“The problematic cookies are the third-party cookies or tracking
cookies that store your browsing history over a long period of time and across
many pages.”).
40. See What’s the Difference, supra note 36 (defining third-party cookies).
41. See Paris Martineau, Facebook is Tracking You on Over 8.4 Million
Websites, THE FUTURE (May 18, 2018, 1:37 PM) (quoting Facebook’s Head of
Public Policy as referencing the Facebook Like button and Share button as two
ways Facebook tracks data) [perma.cc/N3ME-3ZS2].
42. See What’s the Difference, supra note 36 (explaining that first-party
cookies are accessible “to the domain that created [them],” while third-party
cookies are accessible “on any website that loads the third-party server’s code”).
43. See Martineau, supra note 41 (explaining how Facebook tracks its users
and what it does with that tracking data).
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disquieting upon learning that the number of websites that allow
Facebook to track users surpasses eight million. 44
B. How Cookies Function
To understand the potentially dangerous effects of the
irresponsible use of cookies and how the Wiretap Act’s party
exception plays in, it is necessary to understand how cookies
function. Cookies are small text files placed on your device or
browser anytime you visit a website. 45 While these cookies collect
multiple pieces of data from users’ interaction with websites, 46 the
piece of information of focus in internet litigation involving the use
of cookies is the Universal Resource Locator (“URL”). 47 “URLs both
identify an internet resource and describe its location or
address.” 48 URLs also provide other “significant information
regarding the user’s browsing history”: the identity of the
individual internet user, the identity of the web server visited, the
name of the web page visited, and the search terms the user used
to find the web page, among other things. 49 This information
collected through URLs is referred to in the tech world as a “referer
header” or “referer.” 50 The “referer” also tells the website an
internet user is currently browsing what webpage that user was
visiting immediately prior. In other words, it tells the current

44. See id. (stating that in April 2018, Facebook like buttons appeared on at
least 8.4 million other websites, “[m]eaning if you’ve so much as glanced any one
of those eight to eleven million websites, you’ve been logged by Facebook”).
45. See What Is Online Tracking, supra note 32 (explaining how cookies work
on your electronic device).
46. See id. (describing multiple ways websites collect user data and the
different types of data collected).
47. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig., 806
F.3d 125, 135 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing the alleged Wiretap Act violation and
URLs as the content having been intercepted); see also In re Facebook, Inc.
Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating background
facts and identifying URLs as communication content at issue in the case).
48. In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 596.
49. See id. (listing the types of information revealed through a URL address).
50. See id. (explaining that a “referer” is what the collected URL is called in
technical parlance).
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website’s server where the user came from. All this information is
collected as cookies monitor the GET requests submitted by users.
When an internet user clicks on a link or types in URL
information in the address bar, the user’s web browser sends what
is called a GET request to the website’s server. 51 That GET request
tells the website’s server what page the internet user wants to see
and requests that the website server send that web page back to
the internet user’s browser. 52 Before the advent of third-party
cookies, the information transmitted to the website owner’s server
through this communication and the use of the website owner’s
first-party cookie would only be available to the internet user and
the owner of the website visited. 53 The third-party cookie changed
that: now, when the internet user submits a GET request to a
website that interacts with one of Facebook’s millions of thirdparty cookies, either a new third-party cookies is placed on the
internet user’s computer, or a an already existent third-party
cookie is accessed, which then instructs the internet user’s browser
to copy the GET request and forward it to Facebook as well. 54 This
happens without the knowledge of the internet user. 55
Thus, when internet users visit a website, they are consenting
to their information being sent to the server connected to that
website. At the same time, the third-party cookie allows an
unrelated company to receive the same information internet users’
browsers communicate to the website’s server, without any

51. See id. at 607 (explaining how GET requests work).
52. See id. (explaining the two purposes of GET requests).
53. See Michal Wlosik & Michael Sweeney, What’s the Difference Between
First-Party and Third-Party Cookies?, CLEARCODE (last updated July 23, 2021)
(explaining that “[f]irst-party cookies are stored by the domain (website) you are
visiting directly, while [t]hird-party cookies are created by domains other than
the one you are visiting directly”) [perma.cc/5EH9-SKX3].
54. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607 (explaining how third-party websites
with Facebook plug-ins transmit identical GET requests to Facebook’s server so
that both Facebook and the current third-party website receive the same URL
information about users).
55. See id. at 603 (“That this . . . information can be easily collected without
user knowledge is similarly significant.”); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329
F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The pharmaceutical companies’ websites gave no
indication that use meant consent to collection of personal information by a third
party. Rather Pharmatrak’s involvement was meant to be invisible to the user,
and it was.”).

WIRETAPPING THE INTERNET

199

affirmative attempt on the users’ part to connect with that thirdparty company.
C. Circumvention of Private Efforts to Block Third-Party
Cookies
Private efforts to protect users’ information from third-party
cookies have been—and will likely continue to be—unsuccessful,
necessitating a change in the applicable law. In response to
internet users’ concerns over the amount of data collected by
companies like Facebook, other tech companies have made efforts
to protect users’ privacy by blocking third-party cookies. 56 For
example, last year, Apple updated its browser, Safari, to block
third-party cookies by default as a part of its Intelligent Tracking
Prevention (“ITP”). 57 In direct response to Apple’s efforts to block
third-party cookies, Facebook created a new version of what it calls
the Facebook Pixel—a technology that acts as a first-party cookie
and allows website owners to track internet users’ behavior. 58 The
new version of Facebook’s Pixel was announced at the end of 2015,
and Facebook made its use mandatory in 2017—the same year
Apple launched the ITP. 59

56. See Kerry Flynn, WTF Are Facebook’s First-Party Cookies for Pixel?,
DIGIDAY (Oct. 9, 2018) (“Apple and Firefox recently announced that they will be
blocking third-party cookies . . . ”) [perma.cc/DY39-XC7P]; see also In re Google,
806 F.3d at 131 (explaining that Safari’s opt-out cookie blocker, which is activated
by default, was advertised as a unique feature “to better protect [] your privacy .
. . .”).
57. See Nick Statt, Apple Updates Safari’s Anti-Tracking Tech with Full
Third-Party Cookie Blocking, THE VERGE (Mar. 24, 2020, 3:07 PM) (explaining
steps Apple has taken to increase web privacy on its devices) [perma.cc/EE9SJVM8].
58. Compare id. (explaining that Apple launched its ITP in 2017), with Ana
Gotter, Are You Ready for the New Facebook Conversion Pixel?, AGORAPULSE (last
updated Aug. 24, 2021) (reporting that Facebook created the Pixel in 2015 and
made its use mandatory in 2017, not coincidentally, the same year Apple
launched the ITP) [perma.cc/87GU-7TMQ]. See also Flynn, supra note 56 (“This
change was made in light of web browsers like Apple’s Safari, Mozilla’s Firefox
and ad blocking preventing third-party cookies from being trackable.”).
59. See Statt, supra note 57 (“Apple first launched ITP within Safari [in
2017] . . . .”); see also Gotter, supra note 58 (explaining that Facebook launched
the new version of its pixel in 2015 and made its use mandatory in 2017).
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Facebook’s new Pixel performs the same functions of a thirdparty cookie, namely, it duplicates communications submitted to
websites and forwards them to Facebook, but it does so under the
guise of a first-party cookie. 60 Here’s how it works: if a website
owner wants to utilize Facebook’s analytical tools, it must “create”
a Pixel through Facebook by selecting which user behaviors it is
interested in tracking and providing Facebook’s Pixel creator with
a name for the Pixel. 61 Facebook then produces a piece of code that
the website owner can then manually copy and paste into its
website’s code. 62 This is basically reverse plagiarism; it is akin to
someone completing an essay and asking you to give it a title and
sign your name to it, making it appear to anyone who happened to
read the essay as if you were the true author. And because
Facebook made use of the new Pixel mandatory, website owners
who want to advertise through Facebook are effectively forced to
create one of these disguised third-party cookies and place it on
their websites. 63 Because these cookies appear, from a browser’s
standpoint, to have been created by the website owner, any thirdparty cookie blockers employed will be completely circumvented by
the disguised third-party cookie. 64 Essentially, the Pixel is a wolf
in sheep’s clothing.
This is not the first time a company has connivingly
circumvented attempts to protect internet users’ privacy. 65
Another example of this happened in 2011 when Google
deceivingly bypassed Safari’s attempts to block third-party
60. See Flynn, supra note 56 (characterizing Facebook’s launch of the new
version of its pixel as a “first-party cookie” in response to efforts to block thirdparty cookies).
61. See Show Your Ads to the Right People with Facebook Pixel, META FOR
BUSINESS (describing the steps to creating and using Facebook’s Pixel)
[perma.cc/CF4N-GC64].
62. See id. (explaining the various uses for a Facebook Pixel).
63. See Gotter, supra note 58 (“Facebook . . . made the change to the new
pixel mandatory . . . .”).
64. See Flynn, supra note 56 (characterizing Facebook’s launch of the new
version of its pixel as a “first-party cookie” in response to efforts to block thirdparty cookies).
65. See Liam Tung, Google Pays $17m to Settle Safari Cookie Privacy-Bypass
Charge, ZDNET (Nov. 19, 2013) (covering the settlement between Google and
Apple in 2013 for Google’s deceit in bypassing Apple’s Safari browser’s third-party
cookie blocker) [https://perma.cc/P5CR-FF3A].
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cookies. 66 Contemporaneous to this bypass, Google assured
internet users that they could rely on Safari’s default settings to
block third-party cookies. 67 The case resulting from that deceit will
be detailed in Part IV.
Both the examples detailed above prove that big tech
companies that rely on ad revenue will always find a way to get
the data they need, even if they have to resort to deceitful tactics. 68
And the ultimate effect of these tactics, in the context of the
Wiretap Act and its party exception, is to make these third-party
companies appear as the intended parties of the communications
internet users submit to websites through GET requests, therefore
absolving them of any liability under the Act. But are they actually
parties to the communications? The federal circuit courts are split
on the answer to this question. That circuit split will be explored
below.
IV. The Circuit Split
This Part will summarize four pertinent cases. The first two
cases included are In re Pharmatrak, Inc. 69 and United States v.
Szymuszkiewicz. 70 In each of those cases, the First and Seventh
Circuits, respectively, held that the defendants were subject to
liability under the Wiretap Act. 71 The courts in those cases
implicitly found the Act’s party exception to be inapplicable. 72
While Pharmatrak illustrates a court’s application of the Wiretap

66. See id. (explaining an example of Google attempting to avoid efforts to
protect user privacy).
67. See id. (providing another example of deceit by Google in their attempts
to bypass user privacy protections).
68. See id; see also Flynn, supra note 56 (demonstrating that if privacy
protection is preventative of companies gathering data they need, they will use
other means to obtain this data).
69. 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
70. 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010).
71. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 18–23; see also Szymuszkiewicz, 622
F.3d at 706–07 (explaining the result of both of these cases).
72. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d 589, 607 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The First and
Seventh Circuits have implicitly assumed that entities that surreptitiously
duplicate transmissions between two parties are not parties to the
communications within the meaning of the Act.”).
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Act to the use of cookies on the internet, 73 Szymuszkiewicz serves
as an example of how the Act has been applied to an internet case
where the defendant installed software on his boss’s computer that
functioned similarly to cookies. 74
The next two cases summarized in this part are In re Google,
Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation 75 and In re
Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation. 76 Those cases
represent the circuit split for which this note proposes solutions.
Both cases address the application of the Wiretap Act’s party
exception in the internet context—more specifically to internet
companies’ use of third-party cookies. 77
A. In re Pharmatrak, Inc.
Pharmatrak was an enterprising company that provided a
service known as “NETcompare” to pharmaceutical companies. 78
That service accessed and collected certain information about
internet users as they browsed the pharmaceutical companies’
websites. 79 This information was then provided to the
pharmaceutical companies and allowed them to compare their
websites’ traffic and usage with that of other companies in the
pharmaceutical industry. 80 Even though the pharmaceutical
73. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 15 (discussing the use of cookies in the
case).
74. See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 702–03 (explaining that the defendant
had implemented a “rule” on his boss’s computer that duplicated and forwarded
all email messages to the defendant that his boss had received); see also supra
Part III.B (explaining how cookies can be used to duplicate and forward internet
communications to third parties).
75. 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015).
76. 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020).
77. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 140; see also In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at
607–08 (applying the Wiretap Act’s party exception to the use of third-party
cookies and finding the Wiretap Act’s party exception inapplicable to the use of
third-party cookies).
78. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 12 (explaining what type of company
Pharmatrak was and the service they provided).
79. See id. (explaining how the NETcompare service operated and the
function it served).
80. See id. (elaborating on how NETcompare is utilized by pharmaceutical
companies to compare website traffic with other similar companies).
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companies were adamant that personally identifiable information
not be collected by NETcompare, such information was found on
Pharmatrak’s servers, and the users whose information was found
sued Pharmatrak in a class-action lawsuit. 81
NETcompare operated similarly to Facebook’s Pixel. 82
Pharmatrak instructed the pharmaceutical companies to install a
piece of code onto the webpages they wished to track. 83 This code
instructed the computers of users who visited the websites to
communicate directly with Pharmatrak’s server. 84 Through this
communication, Pharmatrak’s server either placed or accessed a
“persistent cookie” on the user’s computer. 85 A persistent cookie is
a cookie that does not expire when a user ends his or her online
session. 86 These persistent cookies tracked internet users across
multiple websites and collected information, such as the URLs
they visited, and that data was recorded on Pharmatrak’s web
servers. 87
Pharmatrak would send monthly reports to the
pharmaceutical companies, comparing the data collected from each
company’s webpage to that collected from other pharmaceutical
companies’ webpages. 88 Although the reports did not contain any
personally identifiable information, and although Pharmatrak
assured its clients that NETcompare could not collect such
information, Pharamtrak had indeed collected personally
81. See id. (revealing that private information, which was not supposed to be
collected, was found on Pharmatrak’s servers, leading to the lawsuit).
82. See Part III. C (explaining that Facebook’s Pixel works and operates in a
similar manner to NETcompare).
83. See In re Pharmatrak 329 F.3d at 9 (detailing Pharmatrak’s instructions
to companies to include code which would allow the website to be tracked).
84. See id. (explaining that the installed code instructed computers to
communicate directly with Pharmatrak).
85. See id. at 14 (detailing the consequences of the communication between
the code and the computer that enabled constant tracking of the website by
Pharmatrak).
86. See id. (defining what a persistent cookie is while implying that a nonpersistent cookie is one that expires upon the cessation of the online session,
highlighting the intrusiveness of this type of cookie).
87. See id. (outlining how the persistent cookie tracked data across multiple
websites that were recorded by Pharmatrak).
88. See id. (revealing what Pharmatrak did with the data once it was
obtained).
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identifiable information about some users. 89 The information
found on Pharmatrak’s servers included “names, addresses,
telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, genders,
insurance statuses, education levels, occupations, medical
conditions, medications, and reasons for visiting the particular
website.” 90
The reason only some users’ personal information was
collected was due to an interaction between NETcompare and code
written by one pharmaceutical client. 91 That client used the GET
method to transmit information from a rebate form on one of its
medications. The client subsequently altered the code for that
specific webpage to use the POST method of transmission
instead. 92
Because NETcompare collected URLs submitted by users
visiting the pharmaceutical companies’ websites, it collected the
information included in the GET requests submitted on this
particular client’s webpage. No evidence suggested that
Pharmatrak had instructed its clients to use either the GET or
POST methods in their installation of the NETcompare code. 93
The First Circuit outlined all the elements of a claim brought
under the Wiretap Act, and it addressed and analyzed the consent
exception in § 2511(2)(d) but ignored the party exception. 94 The
First Circuit ultimately reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings, finding that Pharmatrak could be held liable
under the Wiretap Act, implicitly finding that Pharmatrak was not
a “party” to the communications from online users. 95
89. See id. at 15 (showing the inconsistencies between Pharmatrak action
and what it told its customers).
90. See id. (explaining the type of date collected by Pharmatrak).
91. See id. (discussing the reason that only some users personal information
was gathered and not all users).
92. See id. at 15–16 (explaining the GET method of transmission appends
information submitted by the internet user to the URL, while the POST method
only includes information submitted by users in the body of the request and thus,
such information would not be visible to third parties collecting the URLs visited
by users).
93. See id. (showing that Pharmatrak had not instructed its clients to act in
certain capacities).
94. See id. at 20 (evaluating the consent exception without mentioning the
party exception).
95. See id. at 13. (summarizing the conclusion of the case).
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B. United States v. Szymuszkiewicz
Szymuszkiewicz was a revenue officer who was fearing for his
job, as his driver’s license had been suspended for drunk driving,
and he was regularly required to drive as part of his job. 96 In
response to this concern, Szymuszkiewicz set up a forwarding rule
on his supervisor’s Microsoft Outlook account, which instructed
Outlook to forward all the supervisor’s emails to
Szymuszkiewicz. 97 Szymuszkiewicz was ultimately convicted of
violating the Wiretap Act. 98
Even though the technology at issue in Szymuszkiewicz was
not cookie-based, its functionality was similar to a cookie’s in that
it was placed on the unsuspecting internet user’s computer by a
third party, and it copied and forwarded communications between
the internet user and another party to the third party (in this case,
Szymuszkiewicz). 99
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit focused primarily on the
different elements of a claim brought under the Wiretap Act and
did not address the party exception directly. 100 The court
ultimately held that Szymuszkiewicz was properly convicted for
violation of the Act, implicitly finding that he was not a party to
the communications at issue. 101
C. In re Google, Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy
Litigation
In 2015, the Third Circuit found that Google, among others,
was “the intended recipient[] of the transmissions at issue—i.e.
GET requests that the plaintiffs’ browsers sent directly to
[Google’s] servers,” and therefore, they could not be held liable
96. United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d. 701, 702 (7th Cir. 2010).
97. Id. at 703.
98. See id. at 707 (“Thus Szymuszkiewicz acquired the emails by using at
least three devices: Infusino’s computer . . . the Kansas City server . . . and his
own computer.”).
99. See Part III.B (explaining how third-party cookies function).
100. See id. at 703–07 (discussing the different elements of the Wiretap Act
but not the party exception).
101. Id. at 707.
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under the Wiretap Act. 102 In that case, Google identified and
exploited a loophole in Safari’s third-party cookie blocker. 103 That
loophole was meant to be an exception to Safari’s cookie blocker,
which allowed third parties to install cookies on users’ browsers
only if the browsers submitted a particular form to the third
party. 104 “Google used code to command users’ web browsers to
automatically submit a hidden form to Google when users visited
websites embedded with Google advertisements.” 105 This allowed
Google to then place third-party cookies on users’ browsers despite
Safari’s contrary intention. 106
Significantly, Google not only knew about Safari’s intention to
provide users with enhanced privacy by blocking third-party
cookies, but Google also reassured visitors to its public website that
Safari’s default blocker “would prevent the installation of tracking
cookies.” 107 A consolidated class-action lawsuit ensued, and one of
the claims was that Google had violated the Wiretap Act. 108
In evaluating the Wiretap Act claim, the Third Circuit found
that Google was the intended party to the communications at issue
despite the fact that Google had deceitfully induced internet users
into a false sense of security and continued tracking them by
surreptitiously circumventing Safari’s cookie blocker. 109 In its
reasoning, the court concluded, “[W]e do not agree that a deceit
upon the sender affects the presumptive non-liability of parties
under § 2511(2)(d).” 110 In making this conclusion, the court pointed
to United States v. Pasha, 111 a Seventh Circuit decision that held
102. In re Google, 806 F.3d 125, 142–43 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that the
defendants did nothing unlawful).
103. Id. at 132 (explaining that Safari’s cookie blocker had an exception,
including permitting third-party cookies).
104. Id. at 132 (detailing how the exception to the cookie blocker was intended
to work).
105. Id.
106. See id. (describing how Google was able to utilize this loophole to its
advantage).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 133.
109. See id. at 142–43 (finding Google was an intended party to the
communication).
110. Id. at 143.
111. 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964)
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that a police officer’s impersonation of the intended recipient of a
phone call did not violate the Wiretap Act. 112
To support this conclusion, the Third Circuit also referenced
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Clemons v. Waller, 113 which
pointed out that when Congress amended the Wiretap Act in 1986,
it “specifically mentioned Pasha in its discussion of the ‘party
exception to the communication’ provision.” 114 In Clemons, the
Sixth Circuit went on to reason that § 2511(2)(c), which excepts
parties acting under the color of law from liability under the
Wiretap Act if they are considered parties to the communication,
is synonymous with § 2511(2)(d), which applies to private
parties. 115 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit quoted the Seventh
Circuit in Pasha in reasoning that the party exception to the
Wiretap Act “largely reflects existing law. Where one of the parties
consents, it is not unlawful . . . . ‘[P]arty’ would mean the person
actually participating in the communication.” 116
Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that Google could not be
held liable for its deceit under the Wiretap Act. 117 However, there
are many flaws to this reasoning, which are discussed in
conjunction with the proposed solutions in Part V.
D. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation
In 2020, the Ninth Circuit found that Facebook was not a
“party” within the meaning of the Wiretap Act in its duplication

112. See id. at 198 (“Although the callers . . . were unaware that they were
not being heard by the intended receivers and some were even misled into
believing they were talking to one or the other defendants, the conversation
between the callers and the agent cannot be said to have been intercepted.”).
113. See 82 Fed. App’x 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding investigator was party
to fax transmission from telephone company).
114. In re Google, 806 F.3d 125, 144 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Clemons v. Waller,
82 Fed. App’x 436,442 (6th Cir. 2003)).
115. See id. (reasoning that § 2511(2)(c) is “pari materia with § 2511(2)(d)”).
116. Clemons, 82 Fed. Appx. at 442 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 93–94
(1968) (citing United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964))).
117. See id. at 145 (“Based on the facts . . . the defendants were parties to any
communication that they acquired, such that their conduct is within the
§ 2511(2)(d) exception.”).
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and forwarding of users’ GET requests. 118 There, the class alleged
that Facebook had used cookies to track users throughout the
internet, even when they were not logged into Facebook. 119
Additionally, internal communications between Facebook
executives revealed that they “were aware of the tracking of
logged-out users and recognized that these practices posed various
user-privacy issues.” 120
In its reasoning, the Ninth Circuit referred to the First
Circuit’s decision in In re Pharmatrak and the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Szymuszkiewicz. Both cases, as explained above,
implicitly found that the defendants were not parties within the
meaning of the Wiretap Act and could be held liable for their
interceptions of electronic communications. 121
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the First and Seventh Circuits’
implicit findings and held that Facebook was “not exempt from
liability as a matter of law under the Wiretap Act . . . as a party to
the communication,” 122 reasoning that “[p]ermitting an entity to
engage in the unauthorized duplication and forwarding of
unknowing users’ information would render permissible the most
common methods of intrusion, allowing the exception to swallow
the rule.” 123
V. Proposed Solutions
This Part proposes two solutions to the circuit split
summarized above. Both solutions have as a primary objective the
protection of internet users’ information, with requirements in
excess of the status quo notice-and-consent requirements typical
in privacy law. The first solution proposed is for Congress to update
the Wiretap Act to include a definition for “party.” Such a
definition should be narrow in the interest of protecting internet
118. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th
Cir. 2020).
119. Id. at 596.
120. Id.
121. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607 (explaining both cases and the
implication derived from each that the defendants were not parties to the
communications within the meaning of the Wiretap Act).
122. Id. at 608.
123. Id.
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users’ information. The second solution proposed is for the
Supreme Court to interpret the Wiretap Act’s party exception with
the Act’s objective of protecting the privacy of communications in
mind, rejecting the Third Circuit’s interpretation in In re Google,
and providing lower courts with a clear test with which to analyze
the party exception in the internet context.
A. Heightened Notice-and-Consent Requirement
A well-versed privacy law practitioner may read the two
proposed solutions in this Part and, at first blush, view them as
synonymous with the notice-and-consent requirement generally
found in privacy law. 124 However, the knowledge and consent
requirements proposed here are not to be conflated with the status
quo notice-and-consent requirements typically applied in the
online context that have been scrutinized by privacy experts. 125
Instead, the solutions below intend a heightened requirement for
an entity to be considered a “party” to online communications for
purposes of the Wiretap Act. Additionally, the solutions proposed
are not intended to solve data privacy issues on the internet, but
rather, they are proposed to resolve the circuit split and provide a
workable definition of “party” for purposes of the Wiretap Act’s
party exception.
Heightened knowledge and consent requirements are
necessary, as the likely reaction of companies subject to the
solutions proposed here would be to amend their end user license
agreements, for example, to specifically mention that by clicking
the “I Agree” button, users are agreeing that the company is a
“party” to all their communications; or companies may provide an
obscure banner providing internet users with the option to opt-out
of the company’s privacy practices. 126 The same mechanisms that
124. See Claire Park, How “Notice and Consent” Fails to Protect Our Privacy,
NEW AMERICA (Mar. 23, 2020) (explaining that notice-and-consent requirements
are the status quo in privacy law, particularly on the internet, and this is failing
to adequately protect consumers online) [perma.cc/E4MH-VLNN].
125. See id. (noting that privacy experts are increasingly condemning the
notice-and-consent requirements online companies are required to abide by as
useless).
126. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Contracting Over
Privacy: Introduction, COASE-SANDOR WORKING PAPER SERIES IN LAW AND
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have been used to contract around consumers’ rights to their day
in court should not be allowed in the privacy context online to treat
internet users’ privacy rights as an afterthought. 127
Instead, when it comes to being considered a “party” for
purposes of online communications, the knowledge and consent
requirements proposed in this Part should be viewed as additional,
separate requirements for which a discrete paragraph in a user
agreement or privacy notice will not suffice. This will be discussed
in more depth in the subparts below.
B. Congress Should Update the Wiretap Act to Include a
Definition for “Party”
The issue that led to the circuit split summarized in the
previous Part was Congress’s failure to define “party” within the
meaning of the Wiretap Act and its party exception. 128 It follows,
then, that the seemingly simplest solution would be for Congress
to define the term and resolve the circuit split.
The question that inevitably arises is how Congress should
define the term. Any definition of the term should be crafted with
the Wiretap Act’s primary objective in mind: “to protect effectively
the privacy of communications” 129 from “unseen auditors.” 130
It is important to point out that the issue with internet
companies’ collection of users’ information is not merely the
collection of information itself, but rather, the fact that such
collection is being done without users’ knowledge. 131 It is clear that
ECONOMICS, No. 792, at S8 (2017) (“Firms that develop business models that are
constrained by statutory privacy rules would post privacy notices that effectively
override these rules.”).
127. See id. at S6 (posing the question of whether clicking “agree” is sufficient
to disclaim privacy rights and discussing the use of this mechanism to contract
over such things as warranties and arbitration).
128. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 607 (9th
Cir. 2020) (“The Wiretap Act does not define the term “party” in its liability
exception, and the other circuit courts that have considered the Act’s scope have
interpreted the term in different ways.”).
129. In re Pharmatrak, Inc, 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003).
130. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154 (1968).
131. See Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data: Designing for Transparency
and Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2015) (recognizing that “revelations about
companies’ covert activities . . . make customers nervous” but that “customers
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through the collection and use of users’ data, companies can
provide more value than they otherwise would be able to. 132 In this
sense, user data is treated as currency, providing products and
services to users in exchange for their data, rather than money. 133
Thus, a definition for “party” would need to have the objective
of protecting users’ information in mind, while also avoiding the
complete obliteration of internet companies’ ability to collect such
information. The objective should thus be to enable internet users
to more effectively use their data as a bargaining chip by requiring
more transparency, which would result in users having more
control over the use of their data. 134
1. The Knowledge Requirement
The first requirement for someone to be considered a party to
any communication should be knowledge of that someone’s
presence in the communication. This requirement is in line with
Congress’s expressed intent to prevent “an unseen auditor” from
intercepting communications. 135 Unseen implies unknown. So, as
a threshold element, Congress should require that any entity
claiming to be a party to a particular communication be known to
those actually communicating.
This knowledge requirement is not to be confused with notice
requirements currently used in existing law. 136 “We’ve all seen it

appreciate that data sharing can lead to products and services that make their
lives easier and more entertaining, educate them, and save them money”)
[https://perma.cc/3VNL-JD8C].
132. See id. (explaining the trade between companies that collect data and
consumers from whom the companies collect that data and how value is perceived
differently based on what data is being collected for).
133. See id. (“If companies understand how much data is worth to consumers,
they can offer commensurate value in return for it.”).
134. See Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused
and Feeling Lack of Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Nov. 15, 2019) (presenting results of a study that showed the vast majority of
Americans feel they have little to no control over how their data is used by
companies that collect it online) [https://perma.cc/RHY4-EV5T].
135. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2154 (1968).
136. See Kerry, supra note 6 (“Our existing laws also rely heavily on notice
and consent . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/QH3U-DF9B]; see also Park, supra note 124
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before: you enter a website and a banner pops up along the bottom,
asking you to ‘click here’ to accept the site’s terms of service and
privacy policy.” 137 This is supposed to provide the information
necessary for internet users to consent to the use of their data,
among other things; however, studies show that next to no one
actually reads the terms of service or privacy policies. 138 While this
practice may be sufficient to constitute notice under current law,
it is not enough to provide the requisite knowledge proposed here
for an entity to be considered a party to internet users’ online
communications.
How can internet users give informed consent if they are not
truly informed? Notice should no longer be sufficient. Knowledge
should be the new standard, and the law must require more of
online companies who glean obtuse profits from the use of users’
data. While this conversation is ongoing and will inevitably require
more research and creative solutions, one first step would be to
impose a temporal requirement to the provision of knowledge.
Instead of presenting internet users with the notice one second
before they can access the website or application, users should be
presented with the information when it becomes relevant. 139
One example that illustrates how much more effective this
practice has the potential to be is “Facebook’s pop-up for posting a
photo,” which “offers a bright ‘who can see this?’” link that explains
that aspect of Facebook’s privacy terms. 140 It is one thing to be
aware that something happens—it is entirely different to know
something is happening. Requiring internet companies to provide
(explaining the longstanding practices required by the notice and consent
framework).
137. Park, supra note 124.
138. See David Berreby, Click to Agree with What? No One Reads Terms of
Service, Studies Confirm, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2017) (“[O]n average, these
more careful joiners spent around a minute with the thousands of words that
make up NameDrop’s privacy and service agreements. And then they all agreed
to them.”) [https://perma.cc/WZJ8-HXBH].
139. See id. (proposing as a way of addressing the no-reading problem moving
“the contract out of the one-second moment before access is granted, and to place
its terms before the user when they become relevant”); see also Ombri Ben-Shahar
& Lior Strahilevitz, supra note 126, at S8 (“Firms that develop business models
that are constrained by statutory privacy rules would post privacy notices that
effectively override these rules.”).
140. See id.
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internet users with information on how their data is being used in
real time may not fix the issue altogether, but it would be a good
first step. Studies have shown that “when design invites people to
consider their options, at least some do.” 141
When it comes to design, the obscure banners that pop up at
the bottom of websites are also insufficient to provide the requisite
knowledge. A true conspicuousness requirement should be
imposed that would actually give internet users pause. An
enhanced conspicuousness requirement, combined with a realtime knowledge requirement, would diverge from the current
status quo and prompt more users to consider what is being
presented. 142 At the very least, timing and design changes could be
more effective at educating users on the use of their data as it is
being collected, providing them with the knowledge necessary to
provide effective, not just informed, consent, which will be
discussed below.
2. The Consent Requirement
In addition to the knowledge element, internet users’ consent
should be required. Current privacy law standards require
“informed consent,” but as has been discussed already, the consent
given by internet users online is not informed in the real sense. 143
Part of the reason users lack the sufficient knowledge to truly
consent to how companies collect and use their data is that users
are charged with an unrealistic and onerous duty to comb through
thousands of words in digital contracts. 144 This burden should be
141. See id. (explaining that a study changing how users were presented with
the privacy notice resulted in a 26% difference between those who simply agreed
and those who opted out of the data collection).
142. See Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 126, at S9 (positing that
consumers may so easily agree to opt in, or fail to opt out, because of lack of
information and arguing that “informed consumers might refuse to opt in or
might initiate their own opt outs,” while “uninformed consumers . . . would stick
with any default rule”).
143. See Part V.B.1 (discussing the fact that internet users don’t actually read
privacy notices and are not truly informed of what they are agreeing to online).
144. See Berreby, supra note 138 (explaining that “reading an average
American’s digital contracts would take almost 250 hours a year” and arguing
that burden is exhausting and irrational); see also Kerry, supra note 6 (arguing
that informed consent may have been “practical two decades ago, but it is a
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shifted to the companies profiting from the use of internet users’
data.
One way to shift this burden would be to require an opt-in,
rather than the current opt-out, regime for consent to collection
and use of user data. 145 This would require internet users to
affirmatively consent to the collection and use of their data by, for
example, presenting users with a “yes” and “no” option, rather than
an option to change the default settings. 146 Apple has made this
change, and it has resulted in frustration from Facebook
specifically, evidencing the profound effect such changes may have
if implemented across the board. 147 Such a shift would require
internet companies to take on the burden of informing internet
users in more understandable terms and persuading them to
consent, rather than cowering in the safe harbor that is the opt-out
regime. 148
Although the Wiretap Act currently includes a consent
exception, that exception is one-sided. 149 This allows an internet
company using Facebook’s Pixel, for example, to unilaterally
fantasy today,” as “a constant streams of online interactions” results in no one
reading privacy policies).
145. See Ben-Shahar & Strahlivitz, supra note 126, at S8 (explaining that optin schemes are more protective “because they require firms to get consumers’
affirmative consent to override the pro-consumer status quo,” while “opt-out
schemes . . . put the burden on consumers to initiate the exit from the probusiness status quo.”).
146. See Berreby, supra note 138 (explaining that users were 26% less likely
to accept privacy policies when users were met with a “yes” and “no” option, rather
than a click-to-accept prompt).
147. See Deepa Seetharaman et al., Facebook Meets Apple in Clash of the Tech
Titans—’We Need to Inflict Pain,’ WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2021, 12:00 AM)
(discussing Apple’s changes to its platforms, requiring users to opt into Facebook’s
use of their data and Mark Zuckerberg’s reaction that Facebook needs “to inflict
pain” on Apple) [https://perma.cc/5GQV-TTJN].
148. See Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 126, at S8 (“The contractual
status of privacy notices means that users grant consent to these practices and
thus provide firms a critical safe harbor.”).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful . . . for a
person . . . to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception . . . ”
(emphasis added)); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc, 329 F.3d 9, 19–21 (1st Cir.
2003) (finding that neither party consented to the collection of the information
and explaining that the consent of either would have absolved Pharmatrak from
liability under the Wiretap Act).
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consent to Facebook’s collection of users’ information as they visit
the company’s website. Instead of this one-sided consent
requirement, a definition of “party” should require the consent of
all participants to a particular communication for a third-party
participant to be considered a party.
Apple already implemented such a requirement for companies
who develop applications for the iOS platform. 150 In September
2020, Apple announced planned changes to the software on its
devices. 151 The effect of this update was two-fold: first, it added a
new privacy information section to Apple’s App Store product
pages in an effort to help users understand apps’ privacy
practices. 152 Second, the update required that apps obtain “user
permission to track users across apps or websites owned by other
companies, or to access the device’s advertising identifier.” 153
In effect, Apple made it easier to determine whether users
consent to companies’ participation in their online communications
with web servers. Now, when iPhone, iPad, and Apple TV users
open a different app for the first time, they are greeted by a
prompt, asking if they consent to the app sharing information with
other companies. 154 The prompt and privacy information section in
Apple’s App Store provide users with knowledge, and their decision
when greeted with the app prompts determines their consent or
lack thereof.
Thus, Congress should define “party” to require that all
participants in any communication both have knowledge of, and
consent to, any third party’s involvement in the communication at
issue. This will require internet companies to educate users and be
more transparent in their collection and use of users’ data,

150. Details for App Privacy Questions Now Available, APPLE (Sep. 3, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/Q7BC-ZU84].
151. See id (providing an overview of what changes are included in the
September 2020 updates).
152. See id (explaining that the privacy information section is intended to help
users understand the app’s privacy practices).
153. Id.
154. See Nick Statt, Apple Delays Privacy Feature that Would Let iPhone
Owners Keep Ad Tracking at Bay, THE VERGE (Sep. 3, 2020, 1:16 PM) (“[T]he new
feature will show users a prompt when an app has requested their so-called
Identification for Advertisers.”) [https://perma.cc/RB42-PCGQ].
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providing users with greater control over their data and effectively
protecting the privacy of communications in general.
C. The Supreme Court Should Proffer a Clear Interpretation of
the Wiretap Act’s Party Exception
If Congress does not provide a clear definition for “party,” the
Supreme Court should interpret that term in a way that provides
lower courts with a clear standard to use in determining whether
the party exception applies, particularly in the internet context. In
developing such a standard, the Supreme Court should reject the
Third Circuit’s interpretation of the party exception in In re
Google. That interpretation has multiple flaws, which will be
discussed below.
1. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
Before discussing the Third Circuit’s flawed interpretation of
the Wiretap Act’s party exception and proposing an alternate
interpretation, it is necessary to consider principles of statutory
interpretation.
The first step in interpreting any statute is “of course . . . the
statutory text.” 155 In looking to the text, “[u]nless otherwise
defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance
with their ordinary meaning.” 156 And that “ordinary meaning” can
be ascertained by looking at how the same term is used throughout
the same statute or by an appeal to the dictionary. 157 Furthermore,
a statute’s use of a term presents ambiguity, a court may look to
the statute’s legislative history to understand Congress’s intent
155. See Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (quoting BP America
Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)).
156. BP America Production Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006).
157. See e.g., id. (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the meaning of the
word “cognizable” as used in the Federal Tort Claims Act); Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (relying on regular dictionary definitions to
interpret the word “marketing” as used in the Plant Variety Protection Act);
Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 174 (1993) (relying on the dictionary
definition of the word “principal” as used to modify a taxpayer’s place of business
for purposes of income tax deduction).
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and purpose behind the statute and to interpret the term at issue
in accordance with that intent and purpose. 158
2. The Third Circuit’s Errant Interpretation of the Party
Exception
As a reminder, in In re Google, 159 Google assured internet
users that Apple’s new efforts to block third-party cookies were
sufficient, inducing users into a false sense of security, as Google
proceeded to circumvent protocols on Apple’s Safari so that Google
could continue placing third-party cookies on users’ browsers
without their knowledge. 160 In that case, the Third Circuit
concluded that although Google had surreptitiously placed thirdparty cookies on users’ browsers, it was excepted from liability
under the Wiretap Act’s party exception as a “party to the
communication.” 161 However, the Third Circuit’s reasoning,
particularly its interpretation of the Wiretap Act’s party exception,
is flawed.
The first issue with the Third Circuit’s reasoning arises from
its comparison of Google’s deceitful circumvention of Safari’s thirdparty cookie blocker to a policeman’s impersonation of the intended
party in Pasha. 162 It is a “cardinal rule of statutory construction
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant.” 163
The Third Circuit’s comparison of Google to the police officer treats

158. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588–90 (1981) (relying
on RICO statement of findings and purpose to conclude that the term “enterprise”
as used in the act included criminal conspiracies organized for illegitimate
purposes).
159. 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015).
160. See supra Subpart IV.C (discussing the facts of In re Google and the
Third Circuit’s reasoning).
161. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 142–43; 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018).
162. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 143–44 (mentioning that Congress discussed
Pasha when amending the Wiretap Act).
163. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988).
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§ 2511(2)(c) and (2)(d) as synonymous, 164 which would essentially
render one provision or the other “entirely redundant.” 165
Additionally, Congress clearly did not intend the two
provisions to be synonymous. This is implied by the fact that
Congress left the two provisions separate when it updated the
Wiretap Act in 1986. If Congress truly intended the same analysis
to be applied to those acting under and without the color of law, it
could have easily consolidated the two provisions into one. Instead,
Congress left the two provisions separate, indicating the intent
that the party exception be applied somewhat differently to private
parties as opposed to police officers. This inference is supported by
the inherently different interests involved in each scenario.
When a police officer is acting under the color of law and
impersonates an intended recipient to catch criminals, as was the
case in Pasha, there are clearly different interests involved than
when Google deceives consumers as they browse the internet. In
the first scenario, the public’s interest is at stake, while in the
second scenario, Google is the one benefiting from its deceitful
actions. One potential reason Congress decided to leave the two
provisions separate was because it knew that these different
interests must be considered when determining whether the party
exception would absolve someone of liability under the Wiretap
Act. This obvious distinction should have played into the Third
Circuit’s reasoning and resulted in a finding that Google, unlike a
police officer protecting the public’s interest, could be held liable
for its actions under the Federal Wiretap Act.
The next issue with the Third Circuit’s comparison between
the police officer’s and Google’s deceitful ploys is that the two
instances are distinguishable in an important way. In Pasha, the
police officer was pretending to be someone else, and the callers on
the other end of the communication knew the communication was
taking place, even though they did not know who was on the other
end of the communication. 166 In Google’s case, the communicator

164. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 144 (“In discussing § 2511(2)(c), which is in
pari materia with § 2511(2)(d) . . . ”) (citing Clemons v. Waller, 82 Fed. Appx. 436,
442 (6th Cir. 2003)).
165. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 778.
166. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (explaining
that the callers in the case were “unaware they were not being heard by the
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was not only unaware of who the communication was going to, but
the communicator also did not know the separate duplication and
forwarding of its communications was happening in the first
place. 167 To the contrary, Google assured users that they were
protected from the placement of third-party cookies. 168
Another major issue with the Third Circuit’s decision can be
attributed to a misunderstanding of how third-party cookies
function. In the court’s explanation of the complaint, it said,
“Google used code to command users’ web browsers to
automatically submit a hidden form to Google when users visited
websites embedded with Google advertisements.” 169 That form
triggered an exception in Safari’s third-party cookie blocker and
allowed Google to place cookies on users’ browsers without the
users’ knowledge. 170 In its decision, the court contradicted this
explanation and said that Google was the intended recipient of the
users’ website submissions, even though, according to its own
explanation, the users had no knowledge the information was
being duplicated and forwarded to Google. 171 Contrarily, they were
under the impression, because of Google’s deceit, that their
information was not being gathered and that third-party cookies
were being blocked by Safari’s default settings. 172
Thus, if the Third Circuit followed its own explanation in its
application of the law, it should have decided that Google was not
a party to the communication at issue. The court failed to explain
how Google was the intended recipient of the communications
when there could not have been any sort of intent on the part of

intended receivers and . . . misled into believing they were talking to one or the
other of the defendants”).
167. See In re Google 806 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that Google
exploited loopholes to place third-party cookies on users’ browsers while
simultaneously reassuring visitors to its site that their browsers’ default settings
would block such placement).
168. See id. (“Google not only contravened the cookie blockers—it held itself
out as respecting the cookie blockers.”).
169. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 132.
170. See id. (explaining the functionality of the hidden form).
171. See id. (“[Google] had discovered, and [was] surreptitiously exploiting,
loopholes in . . . the cookie blocker.”).
172. See id. (explaining that Google assured its users that Safari’s cookie
blocker would block all third-party cookies by default).
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the communicator (the user in this instance). The only party who
intended the communications to go to Google was Google itself.
Ironically, after its decision in In re Google, the Third Circuit
contradicted itself by finding correct a jury instruction that defined
a party as “a participant whose presence is known to the other
parties contemporaneously with the communication.” 173 This jury
instruction is directly contradictory to the Third Circuit’s finding
in In re Google, which considered Google a party to the
communications at issue, even though Google’s presence in the
communications was not known to the internet users.
3. The Correct Interpretation of the Party Exception
The party exception to the Wiretap Act says, in relevant part,
“[i]t shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not
acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the
communication . . . .” 174 Significantly, the term “party” is only used
in two other places within the Wiretap Act: in the immediately
preceding provision, which excepts from liability those who act
under the color of law “where such person is a party to the
communication”; 175 and in the Act’s definition of “aggrieved
person.” 176 These uses of the term do not shed much light on its
intended definition.
Merriam-Webster’s definition of “party” is “a person or group
participating in an action or affair.” 177 Furthermore, MerriamWebster defines “participate” as “to take part” or “to have a part or
share in something.” 178 Thus, the plain language definition derived
from an appeal to each of these definitions in the dictionary is that
a person who is a party to a communication actually participates
by having some part or share in the communication. This definition
173. United States v. Eady, 648 Fed. App’x 188, 191 (3d Cir. 2016).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018).
175. Id. § 2511(2)(c).
176. See id. § 2510(11) (“‘[A]ggrieved person’ means a person who was a party
to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against
whom the interception was directed.”) (emphasis added).
177. Party, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, [https://perma.cc/FW76-948N].
178. Participate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, [https://perma.cc/E4ZX-5GV5].
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logically implies that a party to a communication is known to the
other party or parties to that communication and is contributing
something to it, rather than merely listening in or, in this case,
duplicating and forwarding communications created and
submitted by the actual parties to the communication. 179
For example, the police officer in Pasha was a party to the
communication at issue in that case, as he was participating by
sharing the communication with the other party. 180 His presence
was known, even though his identity was not. 181 And he was
impersonating someone—in other words, he was actually
contributing to the conversation, not merely listening in. 182 It
follows that duplicating and forwarding a communication to which
someone does not contribute would not be conduct that would
make that person a “party” to the communication. That conduct
would be entirely separate from the line of communication between
two parties and instead falls squarely within the Act’s definition of
“intercept,” which includes the “acquisition of the contents of
any . . . electronic communication . . . .” 183
This is not to say that to contribute to a communication, a
person must necessarily actively participate. Someone who
passively listens can still be a party to a communication, but the
fact that the person is listening must still be known to the other
party. Otherwise, the entire purpose of the Wiretap Act would be
frustrated. 184

179. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964)
(“Interception connotes a situation in which by surreptitious means a third party
overhears a telephone conversation between two persons . . . . [I]mpersonation of
the intended receiver is not an interception . . . .”).
180. See id. at 196 (describing the actions of the police officers).
181. See id. at 198 (“The bettor intended his words to reach the officer, albeit
the bettor thought he was someone else.”).
182. See id. at 198 (explaining that the call occurred between the callers and
the police officer and that they had a conversation).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2018).
184. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. 329 F.3d 9, 18 (“The paramount objective of
the Wiretap Act is to protect effectively the privacy of communications.”); see also
In re Facebook Inc. Internet Tracking Litig, 956 F.3d 589, 608 (“Permitting an
entity to engage in the unauthorized duplication and forwarding of unknowing
users’ information would render permissible the most common methods of
intrusion, allowing the exception to swallow the rule.”).
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In the Wiretap Act’s legislative history, it addresses—albeit
briefly—the party exception: “‘party’ would mean the person
actually participating in the communication.” 185 The logical
question that follows from this brief attempt at a definition of
“party” is what “actually participating” would look like.
A district court in Illinois followed the Third Circuit’s
interpretation in In re Google and found that even if a person is not
an intended recipient, that person can still be considered a party
to a communication if that person actually participates in the
communication at issue. 186 What is unclear from this definition of
a party the Third Circuit posited is how an entity can be considered
an active participant in a communication if all that entity is doing
is placing a cookie on the user’s computer that secretly duplicates
and forwards to a third party the communications the user
intended to communicate to the website the user was visiting. The
Third Circuit’s loose application of its definition of “party” would
render useless the preclusion of intercepting electronic
communications in the first place, as any entity could utilize
techniques unknown to the average user and collect users’
information without the users’ knowledge but still be considered a
“party” under the law and be exempt from any liability for such
deceit.
This result would run directly contrary to Congress’s
intention, as articulated in the Wiretap Act’s legislative history.
This type of scenario is precisely the type of scenario Congress was
trying to prevent with its amendment to the Wiretap Act in 1968:
“No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his
home and be left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man’s
personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can
be intercepted by an unseen auditor . . . .” 187
“Actually participating” should be interpreted along the same
lines proposed in the previous subpart about Congress’s update to

185. S. REP. NO. 90–1097, at 2182 (1968).
186. Zak v. Bose Corp., No. 17-cv-02928, 2020 WL 2762552, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
2020) (“A person who takes part in a conversation or whose presence is known to
other participants is a party to the communication. Such a person is considered a
party to the communication even if the person was not an intended participant.”).
187. S. REP. NO. 90–1097, at 2154 (emphasis added).
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the Wiretap Act to effectively define “party.” 188 This would mean
that for an entity to be considered “actually participating” in a
communication, internet users should be aware of the entity’s
involvement and consent to it.
The two issues that would likely be a focus of litigation in
these contexts would be (1) whether an internet user had the
requisite knowledge of an entity’s involvement and (2) whether
that entity obtained an internet user’s consent.
In resolving the first issue, courts should use a heightened
reasonable-person standard, considering the same factors as are
discussed in Part V.B.1 above. And that standard should have as
its subject the complainant. Thus, the first question to be resolved
would be whether a reasonable person in the position of the
complainant would have known about the defendant’s
involvement. To prove knowledge, a defendant would have to show
that it conspicuously provided notice to the complainant—for
example, through Apple’s new privacy features discussed above or
through requirements imposed by California’s recently enacted
privacy laws. 189
If a defendant fails to provide evidence showing that a
reasonable person in the complainant’s shoes would have had
knowledge of the defendant’s involvement in a communication, the
first element to being considered a “party” to the communication is
left unsatisfied, and it is unnecessary to continue the analysis
further. However, if the first element is satisfied, the defendant
must then show that the complainant consented to the defendant’s
involvement in the communication. This would be somewhat
easier to analyze, as it would merely require a court to look at how
the complainant acted after being put on notice that the defendant
would be involved in the communication at issue. For example, if
188. See supra Subpart V.A (discussing the requirements that should be
incorporated into a new definition of “party” in the Wiretap Act if Congress were
to amend the act to include such a definition).
189. See supra Subpart V.B.2 (explaining new features Apple is introducing
to educate users about the use of their data on the internet and give them more
control); see also See How the CCPA Affects The Cookie Policy, CLYM (Apr. 7, 2020)
(discussing California’s new privacy laws, which require websites that use cookies
to inform users of such uses and provide them with an easy way of opting out of
cookies and managing how websites use information collected through cookies)
[https://perma.cc/U855-UMZ8].
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the complainant visited a website and closed out or left the website
shortly after being put on notice of another party’s involvement,
the natural inference would be that the complainant had not
consented to the defendant’s collection or use of the complainant’s
data. This element should also be judged according to the
heightened consent standard outlined in Part V.B.2 above,
requiring an opt-in regime and transparency.
VI. Conclusion
Internet companies collect a bevy of data about internet users
on a daily basis, and those companies want to be parties to all
online communications. The Wiretap Act represents a potential
tool that can be used to hold these companies liable if they
overstep; however, internet companies may find safe harbor in the
Act’s party exception. The existing circuit split on whether internet
companies are parties to online communications makes the
outcome of factually similar cases dependent on jurisdiction.
To resolve this circuit split, either Congress should provide a
clear definition for “party” in the Wiretap Act, or the Supreme
Court should proffer its own interpretation of the term. In either
case, a heightened knowledge-and-consent standard should be
applied to grant internet users greater transparency, giving them
more control over their data and allowing for effective, not just
informed, consent.

